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Abstract 
Taking the elusive definition of social enterprise as its starting point, this study seeks to 
understand the impact of government policies in shaping social enterprises in the national 
contexts of the UK and South Korea. The social construction of target populations is utilised as a 
theoretical framework in order to identify which factors influence government policy. The 
research questions are addressed through a comparison of the two countries over a fourteen year 
period from 1997 to 2010. Despite very different contexts, governments in both countries have 
taken an instrumental approach to social enterprise. This tendency is more pronounced in Korea 
however, where government has limited the input of stakeholders and used an approval system to 
control access to the social enterprise name. The study concludes by recommending a more 
value-oriented approach to social enterprise. 
 
Introduction 
For over a decade, studies have been conducted with the goal of defining social enterprise, both 
in terms of a general meaning (Defourny, 2001; Ridley-Duff, 2007) and state-specific meanings 
(J. W. Kim, 2009; Pharoah, Scott & Fisher, 2004). Still, despite extensive research there is no 
widely agreed upon definition. Instead, the characteristics of social enterprises have been shaped 
by the activities of social enterprise practitioners and/or government policies (Parkinson & 
Howorth, 2008; Teasdale, 2011). The present study is concerned with the way in which 
governments attempt to mould the identity of social enterprises through policy design. Policy 
design is usually the outcome of the decisions of many different people, and has been defined as 
‘the elements found in the content of policy that affect target populations and other citizens’ 
(Ingram & Schneider, 1993, p. 71). Among various policy theories used to describe policy design 
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processes (e.g. Sabatier, 2007), this study adopted the social construction of target populations 
because its emphasis on the constructed nature of policy means that it is suited to exploring 
relations between contexts, policy changes and social constructions (Ingram, Schneider & 
deLeon, 2007; Schneider & Ingram, 1993, 2005; Schneider & Sidney, 2009). Specifically, this 
study compared two cases ‒ the UK at the level of the Westminster government, and South 
Korea (hereafter Korea) ‒ to explore whether government policies or any other factors in the 
respective countries drove social enterprise towards similar (or different) paths.  
This study asked, first, ‘What were the contextual factors behind the introduction of 
social enterprise policies and how did they influence government perspectives of social 
enterprise?’ In order to answer this question, various contexts of the countries, such as the socio-
economic situation and the role of policy entrepreneurs, were explored, as proposed in the social 
construction of target populations literature. The second question is directly connected with 
government policy design efforts; ‘What is the impact of government on the social construction 
of social enterprise?’ This question is concerned with the ways in which government actions and 
intentions influence the social construction of social enterprise. The social construction of target 
populations provides a framework to analyse the impact of the intentions of policy makers, the 
extent of control by the government, and citizen participation. On the basis of the findings of the 
first two questions, the third question was ‘Do these factors result in similar (or different) social 
constructions of social enterprise, and why?’ 
There is interest in using social construction and government framing to understand the 
development of social enterprises (Grant & Dart, 2008; Mawson, 2010; Parkinson & Howorth, 
2008; Teasdale, 2011). Studies have focused on issues ranging from identity and self-definition 
as social enterprise (Grant & Dart, 2008), to implementation problems and lack of support for 
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regional networks (Mawson, 2010). Social enterprise discourse in the UK was examined by 
Teasdale (2011) who found that the social enterprise construct had become progressively wider 
as a consequence of efforts by both social enterprise practitioners and government. Parkinson 
and Howorth (2008) revealed how the language of social entrepreneurs in the UK differed from 
that of the government. They found that social entrepreneurs drew legitimacy from local or 
social morality, in contrast to the government generated rhetoric of enterprise with its emphasis 
on management, efficiency and financial independence (Parkinson & Howorth, 2008). While 
these studies have contributed significantly to understanding the construction of social enterprise 
in the UK, they tell us less about how social constructions impact upon policy design. The social 
construction of target populations in particular is suited to uncovering government motives and 
the ways in which social constructions of various groups in society impact upon policy design. 
As such, the social construction of target populations is useful for understanding differences 
between governments and taking a comparative approach. 
The present study was not the first to compare the UK and Korea. McCabe and Hahn’s 
(2006) explorative comparison identified some similarities and differences between the countries. 
They found substantial surface-level differences between social enterprise in the two countries, 
that is, Korea was focused on welfare-to-work policies while the UK had a wider social economy. 
However, they also found some similarities, which at the time included the comparatively 
marginal role of social enterprise, the focus on health, social welfare and environmental services 
operating between state and market, and the burden of expectation in terms of addressing social 
and economic problems in both countries (McCabe & Hahn, 2006). Given the reported move of 
social enterprise in the UK from the economic periphery to the centre (Haugh & Kitson, 2007), 
and the significant growth of social enterprises in Korea in recent years (ML, 2009), the present 
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study re-evaluated social enterprise in the two countries according to the social construction of 
target populations.  
 
The social construction of target populations approach to policy design 
The social construction of target populations is the theory that the intended benefits and burdens 
of policy result not only from the political resources of various groups in society, but are also a 
response to the social constructions of the groups themselves (Ingram et al., 2007; Schneider & 
Ingram, 1993, 2005; Schneider & Sidney, 2009). Over the years, a very broad range of factors 
which could impact upon social constructions have been identified. For example, Schneider and 
Ingram (2005) referred to such factors as diverse as social movements, social science and 
demographic changes. We have summarised the social construction of target populations 
according to direct factors, indirect factors and design intention.  
Indirect factors include external events, political and economic context, and policy 
feedback. The term ‘external events’ refers to incidents which are outside the control of national 
governments that lead to new social constructions and may in turn be embedded by public policy. 
Schneider & Ingram (2005) gave the example of the racial profiling of people from the Middle 
East or of Arabic descent after the September 11 attacks. More generally, the political and 
economic context is important, because social constructions are often influenced by earlier 
policy and political choices (Schneider & Ingram, 1993), and ‘once a course has been set in a 
positive direction in relation to the construction of some group or idea, the difficulties of change 
accumulate over time’ (Schneider & Ingram, 2005, p. 6). A related concept which in reality can 
be very difficult to separate is policy feedback – the interplay between the top-down and bottom-
up aspects of the policy process. Drawing on Wildavsky (1979), Schneider and Ingram (2005) 
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argued that structural opportunities for social mobilisation and changes in social constructions 
could occur as a result of previous policies. It is in this feedback loop that we can see the 
reciprocal way in which public policy and social constructions impact upon each other. 
Moreover, this reciprocal relationship highlights the complexity of the policy design process. As 
Wildavsky (1979, p. 4) stated: ‘past solutions, if they are large enough, turn into future 
problems’. 
Direct factors include public policy and (policy) entrepreneurship. Public policy is 
government’s main mechanism to ‘anchor, legitimize, or change social constructions’ (Schneider 
& Ingram, 2005, p. 5). Especially important in the present study is whether policy leaders wield a 
significant influence in shaping the benefits and burdens of social enterprise policy, and whether 
this is connected with the social construction of the target population (i.e. social enterprise). 
Research has highlighted how ‘the causal link between social constructions and policy designs is 
not inevitable’ (Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2005, p. 223), and Schneider and Ingram therefore 
recognised economic, political, social and moral entrepreneurs as facilitating consensus 
formation between disparate groups (Schneider & Ingram, 2005). Indeed, the role of 
entrepreneurship as a catalyst is well documented in research on the policy process (Kingdon, 
1995; Mintrom & Norman, 2009). Entrepreneurs can therefore be seen to play an important role 
in translating social constructions into policies. 
It is also important to consider design intention, as this can reduce or strengthen the 
resources of the target population (Schneider & Ingram, 1997). We use the term ‘design 
intention’ not only to refer to the intended distribution of benefits and burdens, but also more 
specifically to refer to whether benefits and burdens are intended as goals in themselves or as a 
means of achieving other goals. If a policy is designed to benefit the target population as a goal 
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in itself, the target population may have more chances to increase its autonomy (Chikoto, 2007). 
In this way, government may choose to use social enterprise as a direct path to serving social 
needs or achieving other underlying values inherent in social enterprise (i.e., cooperation and 
mutual support), regardless of other policy goals, such as efficient provision of services. This is 
the value-oriented approach. On the other hand, if government attempts to utilise the target 
population as a means to achieve another policy goal, the government may want to exercise more 
control. In this sense, social enterprise would be utilised only because it is a relatively efficient 
instrument to achieve another mission (i.e., economic targets such as relieving unemployment). 
For the purposes of this study we will refer to this type of rationality as the instrument-oriented 
approach.  
 
Research design 
This study took an explorative format utilising a small-N design (Yin, 2002) under the 
theoretical framework of social construction of target populations. Comparisons were made 
according to the factors discussed in the theoretical section ‒ indirect and direct factors as well as 
design intention, in order to compare their impact on the social construction of social enterprise 
in the UK and Korea.  
The UK and Korea were selected as cases for comparison as they are amongst a relatively 
small group of nations which have legislated for social enterprise. Still, they are very different 
countries, as seen by the parliamentary system of government in the UK in contrast to the 
presidential system of Korea, and the long history of democracy and civil society in the UK, 
while Korea began to democratise after the end of military dictatorship in the late 1980s 
(McCabe & Hahn, 2006). While the UK is among the oldest welfare states, and the state has a 
tradition of directly providing a wide range of health and welfare services from large scale social 
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housing to social services and hospitals, the Korean government has traditionally been a low 
social spender (Hwang, 2006). There has been an increase however in the range of services 
available, particularly following the introduction of the National Basic Livelihood Security 
System in 2000. Yet, due to the continued weight given to economic development by the Korean 
state, this has also been viewed as an opportunity to create new jobs and stimulate the economy 
(Peng, 2009). Interestingly, both countries are now focused on increasing non-state provision, 
although they have approached this from different directions, in the UK there has been a shift in 
emphasis from the state as provider to purchaser, while the Korean state continues in its role as 
regulator, albeit with increased social spending (Kendall, 2000, Peng, 2009).  
There may also be some similarities between the countries, as it has been claimed that 
Korea benchmarked the UK system of social enterprise when formulating policy around the 
period 2004–2006 (Joongang Sunday, 2008). Also in a general sense, the public sector reforms 
of managerialism and outsourcing within the context of hierarchical governance, introduced in 
Korea in the 1990s, echo those introduced in the UK from the 1980s onwards (An, Halligan & 
Wilks, 2002). Accordingly, in both countries, the impact of social enterprise has been relatively 
high on the public sector (Carmel & Harlock 2008, Park, 2008). Yet, there are usually seen to be 
more differences than similarities between the countries. As such we approach the case study 
from a most different perspective in order to answer the research questions and examine whether 
the different contexts lead to similar or different social constructions and policy usages. 
 
Case analysis of social enterprise in the UK and Korea 
In both the UK and Korea, the term ‘social enterprise’ has only come to be widely used during 
the past decade. This time has seen tremendous developments however, with social enterprise 
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policy in the two countries being shaped by direct and indirect factors, as well as design intention. 
Since it is almost impossible to exclusively separate the influences of these factors we will 
examine developments chronologically. From a government perspective it appears that interest in 
social enterprise started earlier in the UK than in Korea. As such the time frame begins two years 
earlier in the UK (1997) than Korea (1999). We broke the time period into three separate phases 
to aid both ease of comprehension and comparison. 
 
Period one: the incubation period 
UK. While the late 1990s were a time of relative economic stability in the UK, the political 
ground was shifting. The election of a Labour government in 1997 after 18 years in opposition 
meant that the ‘third way’ project and its ‘post-ideological approach’ moved centre stage. A 
consequence was that social exclusion and community development were high on the agenda, as 
was competitive tendering for public services, an area in which the government was interested in 
capacity building (Kendall, 2000). As highlighted in Table 1, social enterprises were beginning 
to emerge in several sectors, even if the term ‘social enterprise’ itself was new to many. The day 
after he became prime minister in May 1997, Tony Blair described his aim of ‘backing the 
thousands of social entrepreneurs. Those people who bring to social problems the same 
enterprise and imagination business entrepreneurs bring to wealth creation’ (Smith, 2000, p. ?). 
The new Labour leadership clearly saw the potential for social enterprise, particularly in relation 
to social exclusion (HM Treasury, 1999). However, no explicit policies were made regarding 
social enterprise at this time. 
Table 1 to feature here 
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This did not deter social enterprises from trying to gain more support, both from local and 
central government. In 1998 Social Enterprise London (SEL) was set up by social enterprises, 
with financial support from London councils and state funding agencies to support the 
development of social enterprises in London. It is important to note the central role of 
cooperatives at this time, as the initial subscribers of SEL all belonged to the cooperative 
movement (Teasdale, 2011). This was followed by the establishment of a national body in 2000, 
the Social Enterprise Coalition (SEC), which was formed in order to secure more government 
support, particularly as the members thought that social enterprise provided a practical response 
to three of the government’s policy drivers; competitiveness, social inclusion and a modernising 
agenda (Social Enterprise London, 2000). In this sense, the policies of the third way created an 
environment in which social enterprises were encouraged to push for further government support, 
completing a feedback loop.  
 
Korea. The Korean welfare system traditionally placed more emphasis upon the family and 
employer rather than the state. However, due to an external event, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, 
this traditional welfare system was threatened. A large number of businesses underwent 
structural reform at the behest of the IMF, and many people lost their jobs and were therefore 
unable to support their families. As highlighted in Table 2, in the face of these urgent problems 
the Korean government introduced the ‘Public Work Programme’ as part of the National Basic 
Livelihood Security Act in 1999. The main goals of this policy were to resolve welfare and 
unemployment problems simultaneously by providing social security and creating jobs for the 
poor unemployed (Park, 2009). Thus, the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) was a key 
policy actor and, in order to accomplish the policy goal, the MHW engaged the pre-existing local 
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community institution, ‘Self Support Community Centres’ (SSCCs) as a policy partner, 
providing services under contract to the MHW.  
Table 2 to feature here 
SSCCs originate from the mid-1970s when volunteers began to organise at the local level 
for the purpose of helping the poorest people, especially through job training or providing 
temporary (often menial) jobs. There are similarities between the SSCCs and work integration 
social enterprises (WISEs), as they share many of the characteristics of social enterprise as 
identified by Defourny (2001). For example, SSCCs follow rules such as a minimum amount of 
paid work, an explicit aim to benefit the community, an initiative launched by a group of citizens, 
and a decision-making power not based on capital ownership. Thus, social enterprise in Korea 
can be traced back to the SSCCs (Kim, 2008). The government’s aim in partnership with the 
SSCCs was to benefit the low-income level by connecting job provision and welfare services. 
However, the focal point was not the mid-to long-term provision of welfare services, but to 
enable low-income welfare recipients to become self-sufficient in the short-term in the market. 
The government needed to reconsider the policy though when the programme struggled to meet 
these aims.  
 
Period two: development of social enterprise policies  
UK. Under the second Blair government support for social enterprise increased considerably. 
The Social Enterprise Unit was launched inside the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in 
2001 with a coordination and development remit. While there were policy entrepreneurs in the 
form of social enterprise practitioners who lobbied the government, there were also policy 
entrepreneurs inside government, including not only Blair and Brown but also other senior 
ministers such as John Prescott and Patricia Hewitt (Lyons, 2002). As Secretary of State at the 
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DTI, Hewitt oversaw the introduction of the Social Enterprise Unit and the subsequent social 
enterprise strategy in 2002. The strategy was a three year plan concerned with promoting and 
sustaining social enterprise. Notably, the main strategy document set out the government 
definition of social enterprise as ‘a business with primarily social objectives whose surpluses are 
principally reinvested for that purpose in the business or the community’ (DTI, 2002, p. 14). The 
definition was formulated in agreement with a selection of social enterprise practitioners (Bland, 
2010), and also included a list of characteristics that the DTI believed successful social 
enterprises exhibit. Along with entrepreneurial and social aspects, these included ‘stakeholder 
engagement’ and ‘democratic and participative management’ (DTI, 2002, p. 16). Nevertheless, 
the characteristics were interpreted as a move towards including social businesses (i.e., profit-
driven businesses with social goals), which were seen as having a role to play in public service 
reform (Teasdale, 2011). This expansion of the social enterprise concept was resisted by 
cooperatives and community-based social enterprises due to the belief that social goals are at the 
core of social enterprise (Teasdale, 2011). 
The new policy was accompanied by new funding patterns, intended to build the capacity 
of the third sector, which through quangos such as Futurebuilders, offered loans and grants to 
third sector organisations delivering public services (Alcock, 2010). It has been suggested that 
government strategies at this time represented the normalisation of voluntary and community 
organisations, including social enterprises, as market-responsive service providers disconnected 
from their original social goals (Carmel & Harlock, 2008). Similarly, in the area of work 
integration, Aiken and Bode (2009) found that managerialist partnership structures led to the use 
of social enterprise and other third sector organisations as deliverers of welfare programmes. 
Significantly they found that the need of the organisations to focus on work integration prevents 
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them from being fully economically independent and leaves them dependent on state funding. In 
addition, they argued that a focus on contracts ‘threatens to denude by neglect the milieu – the 
infrastructure, the lattice of networks, trust and relationships which had been created and 
reproduced over many years and within which social empowerment and work integration 
activities reside’ (Aiken & Bode, 2009, p. 221). 
While the government had not been entirely responsible for the social construction of 
social enterprise, developments do suggest that the government attempted to use social enterprise 
in an instrumental manner in order to provide services. In creating this version of social 
enterprise, the government relied upon two extant social constructions; entrepreneurs and 
voluntary sector organisations. New Labour’s view of entrepreneurs as deserving of policy 
support can be seen in party documents (Labour Party, 1996), and the way in which the Labour 
governments sought to expand entrepreneurialism to new areas including social policy 
(Scourfield, 2007). There was also an attempt on the part of government to associate social 
enterprise with the positively constructed voluntary sector. The voluntary sector was integral to 
the new Labour brand, as seen by the emphasis on the third sector and the inclusion of voluntary 
organisations in the revised party constitution which was intended to make the party more 
electable (Labour Party, 1996). While the party had long lasting links with the sector it is worth 
noting that public awareness of the voluntary sector in the late 1990s was boosted by the 
National Lottery TV show, which for the first few years had huge viewing figures, and which 
contained information about the voluntary sector when it told viewers where the proceeds of the 
lottery were spent (Kendall, 2000). As such, it did not trouble the Labour Party to offer benefits 
to the positively constructed voluntary sector. 
  
14 
Social enterprises were now receiving policy support and funding, and in 2005 the 
government established the community interest company (CIC) legal form, specifically for social 
enterprises. The legislation contained an asset lock mechanism (also offered by industrial and 
provident societies) to restrict the proportion of profit which can be redistributed to shareholders 
to 35 per cent. More divisively, the CIC regulations did not stipulate the democratic structure of 
social enterprise. This meant that there was no legal requirement to involve stakeholders in 
decision making processes, unlike in other European countries (Nyssens, 2009). The CIC 
regulations therefore represented a significant shift from the government’s earlier view of the 
characteristics of successful social enterprises. Some have argued that the governments’ 
approach overlooked the employee-owned or cooperative sectors (Ridley-Duff, 2007). Others 
have suggested that the CIC form is a move away from the third sector and an attempt to give 
social enterprises more freedom to act like mainstream businesses (Dunn & Riley, 2004). This 
perspective is supported by the light touch role of the CIC regulator (Nicholls, 2009). While the 
widening of the social enterprise construct to include social businesses in this way may allow for 
the effective delivery of services, it again suggests an instrumental view of social enterprises 
from the government.  
 
Korea. With the shift in concern from the Asian financial crisis (welfare and unemployment) to 
jobless growth (unemployment only), the focus of the government was modified to ‘longterm job 
creation rather than social service provision for the socially disadvantaged’ (Park, 2009, p. 19). 
Consequently, a new social enterprise program was started in the Ministry of Labour (ML), 
which signified a refocusing of the government strategy from a mixture of welfare and labour 
policy to just labour policy (Park, 2008). Rather than the SSCCs, the primary policy partners in 
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the ML’s ‘Social Workplace Programme’ (SWP) were closer to the US-style of social enterprise; 
nonprofits with an emphasis on revenue generation in the market economy. The SWP, which was 
implemented mostly by local branches of the ML and its contractors (Ko, 2007) also led to the 
expansion of target beneficiaries of the policy from the vulnerable to the general unemployed, 
through the introduction of a job stabilisation policy (Ko, 2007). Nevertheless, the majority of 
jobs created were unstable and temporary (Kim, 2008; J. W. Kim, 2009; Ko, 2007; Park, 2008). 
Searching for an alternative to overcome these problems, the ML consulted academics and NGO 
professionals before modifying the policy from the SWP to the Social Enterprise Policy. 
The programme introduced by the Social Enterprise Promotion Act (SEPA) in 2007 can 
be seen as a modification of the SWP because the focus remained on secure job creation (Park, 
2009). Indeed, between periods 2 and 3, not only was their continuity in the unemployment 
problem (i.e., jobless growth), but the main policy actor was the same (ML), and the policy field 
and target beneficiaries were the same. Only the policy tool changed, from contracting out to the 
approval system. The approval system is so named as, under Article 19 of the SEPA, the use of 
‘social enterprise or similar terms’ is prohibited without approval from the ML. With the SEPA 
the main intention of the government was to utilise social enterprise as an instrument to achieve 
job stabilisation. This instrumental rationality of the government can be demonstrated both 
through the redefinition of social enterprise and the use of the approval system as a means of 
control. 
Social enterprise was redefined as a market-oriented institution due to its ability to 
(relatively cheaply) help resolve the jobs crisis. The internal memoranda of the SWP Task Force 
in 2005 reveal how government officials argued for the programme to be more ‘market-oriented’ 
and for ‘sustainable profit-oriented’ organisations, thus underlining their desire for the 
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participation of business firms (Park, 2008, p. 10). In addition, they argued that the ‘market-
friendly American model is better than the European one’ and saw job creation as the social role 
of business firms (Park, 2008, p. 11). This market-oriented perspective served to restrict the 
meaning of social enterprise to a financially sustainable entity functioning in the market. 
In the SEPA, the government categorised social enterprises into four organisational types 
- job creation type (WISEs), social service provision type, mixed type (a combination of the 
WISE/social service types), and the miscellaneous type. According to Article 8 of the Act, the 
purpose of the approval system is the prevention of inappropriate social enterprise emergence, or 
in other words, initiatives that do not correspond to the ML’s criteria. In order to be approved as 
a social enterprise, an organisation must fulfil seven criteria relating to the type of organisation, 
the proportion of paid-employees, social goals, decision making governance, organisational rules, 
and limited profit-distribution. When an organisation meets these criteria it is also eligible to 
receive a range of support from the government, including financial subsidies (i.e. initial capital 
and salary support), managerial support, tax exemption, and social insurance support (ML, 2009). 
Academics have argued that social enterprise cannot be limited to a specific meaning, but 
instead requires a flexible and diverse definition (Defourny, 2001). In Korea, however, diverse 
types of social enterprise (i.e. nonprofits or SSCCs) are no longer considered to be social 
enterprises, even when their mission and operations fit with broad theoretical definitions. 
Organisations are subject to a very high degree of coercive isomorphism, as they must agree to 
follow government, not just to receive funding, but even to be considered social enterprises (Kim, 
2010). The ban on using the name social enterprise without government approval indicates the 
high degree of governmental control, and demonstrates the legacy of the developmental state 
which was at its height in the 1970s when the government demanded that Korean multinationals 
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operate in the nation’s interests (Park, 2009). The approval system has had the effect of 
standardising the social enterprise sector. While this increases efficiency, it can also lead to a 
loss of flexibility, diversity, and most importantly autonomy for social enterprise. In this way, the 
resources of social enterprises have been reduced, and they have become more dependent upon 
government.  
 
Period three: the refining of social constructions 
UK. In the final period of this study the social constructions of social enterprise which were 
created in the second period were refined. The 2006 merger of the Social Enterprise Unit with 
the Active Communities Directorate to form the Office of the Third Sector, partly a result of the 
lobbying of voluntary sector organisations (Alcock, 2010), meant a move away from the DTI. 
Teasdale (2011) has documented how this move led to a widening of the social enterprise 
construct to include earned-income discourse, that is, voluntary sector organisations providing 
public services. Changes within government also appear to have encouraged an emphasis on 
earned income, as following the arrival of Patricia Hewitt as Health Secretary, the government 
further expanded the range of areas in which it was promoting social enterprise to include the 
National Health Service (NHS) (Department of Health, 2006). Significantly, an additional social 
enterprise unit was established within the Department of Health to support groups of employees 
who wanted to opt out of the NHS, marking a much more proactive approach from the 
government. Government figures estimated 62,000 social enterprises in the UK in 2009 
(Hampson, 2009), a figure which is attributable to the widening of the social enterprise construct, 
and greater use of the organisations in providing public services.  
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These developments raised concerns that social enterprise represented a new form of 
privatisation along with inferior wages and working conditions (Marks & Hunter, 2007). 
Moreover there are concerns that the government’s approach limited the potential of social 
enterprise to fulfil their goals. Some observers argued that social enterprises were beginning to 
display ‘coercive isomorphism’ under pressure from procurement policies and ‘mimetic 
isomorphism’ as they imitated best practices in order to survive (Aiken & Slater, 2007). While it 
may be expected for government to contract with large organisations, the danger is that through 
isomorphism, some of the benefits of the market may be lost, as differences and hence choice 
between providers becomes less clear (Aiken & Slater, 2007).  
 
Korea. The defining characteristic of the third period in Korea was increasing focus on job 
creation. Table 3 shows that organisations whose mission is to create jobs have faced lower 
barriers to be awarded social enterprise status. Considering that the mixed type also emphasises 
job creation, the vast majority of social enterprises can be seen as focusing on job creation. In 
addition, in 2009, the ML reported that more than half of the total organisations (263 out of 515) 
that had applied for social enterprise status since 2007 had not been approved. It should be noted 
that the main reason for rejection was a lack of profit from business activities (108 out of 263 
rejected organisations) (ML, 2009). 
Table 3 to feature here 
A further consequence of the approval system concerns the organisational background of 
social enterprises. Business firms dominate (209 organisations, 41.7%), while 148 (29.6%) are 
approved nonprofits (i.e., nonprofit organisations and social welfare foundations) and 130 
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(25.9%) are incorporated associations. Other organisational types are SSCCs (13 organisations, 
2.6%) and educational foundation (1 organisation, 0.2%).  
Table 4 to feature here 
Following the election of President Lee Myung-Bak, social enterprise has remained on 
the political agenda (Office of the President, 2008). Perhaps unsurprisingly though, under Lee’s 
conservative administration the emphasis has remained on a market-oriented approach; ‘social 
enterprise should survive in the market’ (ML, 2009). 
However, attempting to situate WISEs in the market is problematic, not least because 
employees in WISEs, who include the elderly along with people with disabilities, are often 
unskilled labourers (S. K. Kim, 2009). Moreover, the market approach can detach the 
organisations from their social goals, as they strive instead to meet financial goals. Consequently, 
the majority of jobs created have been low quality, as they have been either temporary, required 
unskilled labour, or provided a low-income (J. K. Kim, 2009). Attempts to meet government 
targets can have a similar effect. For instance, when the ML took the initiative in policy making, 
the group of target beneficiaries expanded to the general unemployed (Ko, 2007). While the 
definition of social enterprise in Article 2 of the SEPA stresses that ‘social enterprise seeks social 
goals by offering social services or jobs to the socially disadvantaged and the vulnerable’ 
(emphasis added), in reality due to the need to meet government targets, Korean social 
enterprises take on a much more general role. 
 
Comparing the construction of social enterprise in the UK and Korea 
This case-study has highlighted the similarities and differences between the two countries 
as displayed in Figure 1 below, which compares the two countries according to indirect factors 
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for social construction, the problem identified, direct factors for social construction, and design 
intention.  
Firstly, the contrasting political and economic situations meant that indirect factors were 
different in the two countries, as were the problems identified. In the UK, a level of continuity 
with earlier policies in terms of outsourcing welfare services meant that it was imperative to 
build the capacity of providers, as the market had failed to meet the needs of the state. The 
policies of the third way also encouraged the development of social enterprises as, along with an 
emphasis on tackling social exclusion, they simultaneously stressed competitiveness and social 
goals. Later, when the process of outsourcing was extended to the NHS, the problem of finding 
service providers once more reared its head. On the other hand, in Korea, the Asian financial 
crisis as an external event, followed by jobless growth, meant that the government was seeking a 
means of creating jobs.Initially the target recipients were welfare recipients and the near poor, 
however when unemployment levels remained high despite economic growth, the government 
changed its focus from a combination of labour and welfare policy to concentrating on labour 
policy. 
Figure 1 to feature here 
Moving on to direct factors, in the first period the SEC was the main initiator in the UK, 
while the government at that time was less active, and thus practitioners were a direct factor in 
the initial social construction. Later, when the government introduced social enterprise policies, 
they revealed a view of social enterprise as a means to respond to market failure, and 
subsequently perceived state failure. Both of these changes in social construction were 
introduced despite a degree of resistance from social enterprise practitioners. In Korea the 
government was the main actor to introduce social enterprise. Unfortunately, it is difficult to find 
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evidence of stakeholder involvement in the process of policy design in Korea. Since citizens 
were not familiar with the concept of ‘social enterprise’ and they did not possess sufficient 
information, there was little chance of their views being heard by policy makers in order to 
influence policy design processes. Thus, the government, policy advisors and senior bureaucrats 
were the dominant actors in the design of social enterprise policy in Korea. In the second period, 
professionals from civil society were invited to help design the policy, but their role was limited 
to assessing the potential usefulness of social enterprise in meeting the problem of jobless growth. 
Interestingly, despite different definitions and specific policy goals in the two countries, 
government intentions displayed instrumental rationality towards social enterprise, and the role 
of social enterprise as public service provider was stressed. The extent of instrumental rationality 
in the two countries differed however, largely due to the different combinations of actors which 
participated in the policy processes, but also because of different economic situations and 
government intentions. In Korea, the market-oriented policy approach has been accompanied by 
strong government control, as can be seen most clearly with the approval system, which has been 
used primarily in order to create organisations which can respond to the problems of jobless 
growth. This tendency has been less marked in the UK, where the government has been keen to 
promote social enterprise as a solution to a wider range of problems. In part, this is due to the 
state’s history of involvement in a wider range of welfare services when compared to its Korean 
counterpart. Still, all things considered, the degree of control of the UK government over social 
enterprise was relatively limited. A key difference here can be seen in the way that the leaders of 
the UK government, while interested in public service reform, were also focused on the need to 
be seen to be delivering advantages to the voluntary sector, while the Korean government 
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prioritised the need to be seen to be effectively responding to economic challenges at all costs, 
and thus reprised its role as the developmental state. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
In both the UK and Korea governments have been very active in introducing social enterprise 
policies. Through the case analysis, this study found both similarities and differences between 
the policies of the UK and Korea. Taking similarities first, in both countries the initial rhetoric 
was concerned with social goals, yet the practice has been more concerned with meeting 
instrumental goals. These instrumental goals have differed according to the national welfare 
systems, with the UK government prioritising efficient service provision, while the Korean 
government used the approval system to focus on job creation, and changed the target 
beneficiaries from the vulnerable unemployed to the general unemployed. A consequence is that, 
in both countries, governments have limited the ability of social enterprise to respond to social 
problems. One explanation for this is due to a lack of integration in the means-ends hierarchy. It 
seems that both the UK and Korean governments have not always prioritised social enterprise as 
a means of pursuing value rationality amidst the tangled web of means and ends that sometimes 
characterises modern government (Simon, 1997). 
This brings us back to the complexity of the policy process and Wildavsky’s (1979) 
warning about past solutions leading to future problems. In the UK and Korea governments have 
utilised social enterprises as a solution to the lack of capacity amongst government contractors 
and as a means of job creation respectively. This has impacted on the autonomy of social 
enterprises, in that they have become more dependent upon the state through contracts and the 
approval system. The dangers of organisations operating in close proximity to the state are well 
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documented (Wolch, 1990). In addition, it could jeopardise the existing ability of social 
enterprises to raise their own funds and to provide a real alternative to state or private sector 
provision. 
Though the role of government differs in the two countries, it has nevertheless had a 
significant impact. The UK government was not the only actor, and social enterprise 
practitioners played an important role. Still, the role of the UK government as a policy 
entrepreneur was influential, particularly as leading ministers acknowledged the strategic 
importance of the voluntary sector (Hewitt, 2001). In addition, the Labour government in the UK 
provided considerable funding to the community and voluntary sector and promoted social 
enterprise in its efforts to create a mixed economy of welfare (Aiken, 2006). In this context, the 
role of policy entrepreneur has been important, as discussed in the literature on the policy 
window model (Kingdon, 1995), advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier & Weible, 2007) or 
policy entrepreneurship model (Mintrom & Norman, 2009). While successive Korean 
administrations have also supported the development of social enterprise, the legacy of the 
developmental state has been influential in the introduction of an approval system and the way in 
which government has controlled private organisations in order to be seen to be benefiting the 
public. One consequence of government in the UK not totally constructing the concept is that 
there are many more social enterprises in the UK and they take on a wider range of forms. 
Nevertheless, they face similar difficulties to their Korean counterparts in terms of achieving 
their social goals. It is understandable that social enterprise policy differs by nation as 
governments construct social enterprise policies according to national context. However, 
constructing an instrument-oriented social enterprise policy means that it is difficult for social 
enterprises to operate under less hierarchical models of governance.  
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Making significant changes to the construction of social enterprises may be difficult 
however, due to the way in which social constructions can become embedded over time. This 
can be seen in the UK through the strengthening of the instrumental view of social enterprise 
under the Cameron government since the 2010 election. Increased use of social enterprises as 
public service providers is at the core of the flagship ‘Big Society’ policy programme. While 
there has been an attempt in the Public Service Act, passed in 2012, to make the creation of 
‘social value’ an important procurement criterion, according to market liberal interpretations, all 
enterprises may be seen as creating social value (Teasdale, Alcock & Smith, 2012). There is 
considerable room for interpretation by the commissioners of services, however in light of the 
public spending cuts it seems likely that social enterprises may be pitted against private 
companies in order to provide efficient services. The established social construction has also 
been maintained in Korea where the existing construction of social enterprise has already 
survived the transition to a new president and ruling party following the 2007 elections. Most 
significantly, the approval system is still in operation and the proportion of social enterprises that 
are classified as the job creation type has grown each year (see Table 3).  
While other studies have examined the construction of social enterprise (Mawson, 2010; 
Parkinson & Howorth, 2008; Teasdale, 2011), we have also illustrated how the social 
constructions of social enterprises have been important in their instrumental use by government 
in the UK, and particularly in Korea. This study has highlighted how governments have been 
able to make significant changes to social enterprise within a relatively short period of time. The 
theoretical framework of the social construction of target populations has been appropriate for a 
comparative examination of the use of social enterprise as a policy tool. A limitation of the 
framework though is that its applicability is limited to countries with social enterprise policies. 
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Nevertheless, there are a growing number of countries in this category (Kerlin, 2010). The social 
construction of target populations therefore has potential as a comparative framework for the 
study of social enterprise.  
Still, there are counter arguments, which may dispute what could be interpreted as a 
suspicious view of government. For instance those who take a more positivistic approach to the 
policy process, who argue that policy makers have few alternatives, particularly in the context of 
increased pressure to reduce government spending, may find our perspective to be too critical of 
government and policy makers. Moreover, it is unlikely that those who receive benefits from 
social enterprise policy, especially those organisations with the moral and financial backing of 
government will feel that there is bias in the policy process, although this is likely to change 
rapidly if they come to receive the burdens of policy.  
Changing social constructions is not impossible however, and policy design is a continual 
process. In order to create a policy framework for social enterprise that enables them to follow a 
more value-oriented approach, there are steps which policy makers could take. Firstly, in the 
Korean case, the replacement of the approval system with a much lighter form of regulation 
would recognise the diverse kinds of social enterprise already operating in Korea under other 
names and may encourage more innovative solutions to social problems due to the loosening of 
top-down controls. Secondly, in both countries, while it is currently unlikely that governments 
will emphasise grant-funding and thereby increase the autonomy of social enterprises, there 
would be benefits in receiving input from social enterprises in the design of the employment and 
welfare services which they provide. In particular, greater acknowledgement from public 
organisations of the costs of service delivery, and the impact of government criteria and targets 
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on quality would represent a good starting point to enable social enterprises to achieve their 
social goals.  
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Figure 1. Policy design and the social construction of social enterprise.  
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Table 1. Social enterprise policy in the UK over three periods. 
 
Timeline 1997‒2000: Period 1 
First Blair government 
2001‒2005: Period 2 
Second Blair government 
2005‒2010: period 3 
Blair/Brown 
Public policy The Third Way Strategy for Social Enterprise 
CIC legislation 
Our health, our care, our say 
(Department of Health, 
2006). 
Main 
governmental 
department 
Treasury Department of Trade & 
Industry  
Office of the Third Sector 
Main policy 
partners/ policy 
tool 
Cooperatives & voluntary 
sector organisations/ 
Community development & 
contracting-out 
Voluntary sector organisations 
& social businesses/ 
Contracting out 
Earned income for non-
profits 
Target 
beneficiaries 
Housing, social care, leisure 
centres, communities, work 
integration 
Third sector as a whole Third sector as a whole & 
NHS 
Policy field Business/voluntary sector Business/voluntary sector Voluntary sector/ NHS 
Target problem Social exclusion/service 
provision 
Service provision Service provision/ NHS 
inefficiency 
 
Table 2. Social enterprise policy in Korea over three periods. 
Timeline 1999‒2002: Period 1 
Kim administration 
2003‒2007: Period 2 
Roh administration 
2007‒2010: period 3 
Roh/Lee administration 
Public policy Public Work Programme 
(National Basic Livelihood 
Security Act) 
Social Workplace Program Social Enterprise Policy 
(Social Enterprise Promotion 
Act) 
Main governmental 
department 
MHW as lead department 
(& ML as partner) 
ML as lead department (& 
other departments including 
MHW as partners) 
ML  
Main policy 
partners/ policy tool 
SSCC (cooperatives)/ 
Contracting out 
US-style NPO & SSCC/ 
Contracting out 
Social enterprise/ approval 
system 
Target beneficiaries Welfare recipients and/or 
the near poor 
Expansion to general unemployed (those ineligible for basic 
welfare) 
Policy field Combination of welfare 
and labour policy  
Labour policy (welfare policy became secondary)  
Target problem Poverty and unemployment 
(due to Asian financial 
crisis) 
Jobless growth Unemployment (exacerbated 
by financial crisis) 
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Table 3. Approved social enterprises in Korea by goal type (December 2010). 
  
Total Job creation Service Delivery Mixed Misc. 
2007 51 15(29.4%) 7(13.7%) 15(29.4%) 14(27.4%) 
2008 161 73(45.3%) 22(13.7%) 46(28.6%) 20(12.4%) 
2009 77 46(59.7%) 8(10.4%) 16(20.8%) 7(9.1%) 
2010 212 151(71.2%) 7(3.3%) 16(7.5%) 38(17.9%) 
Total 501 285(56.9%) 44(8.8%) 93(15.8%) 79(15.8%) 
Source: Kwak (2010, p. 29) and Social Enterprise Promotion Agency (2010, p. 16). 
 
 
 
Table 4. Approved social enterprises in Korea by organisational type (December 2010). 
  Total Business Nonprofit 
Social 
welfare 
foundations 
SSCC 
Inc. 
Association 
Educational 
foundation 
2007 51 21(41.2%) 4(7.8%) 5(9.8%) 5(9.8%) 16(31.4%) 0(0.0%) 
2008 161 70(43.5%) 21(13.0%) 27(16.8%) 6(3.7%) 37(23.0%) 0(0.0%) 
2009 77 35(45.5%) 13(16.9%) 9(11.7%) 0(0.0%) 20(26.0%) 0(0.0%) 
2010 212 83(39.2%) 51(24.1%) 18(8.5%) 2(0.9%) 57(26.9%) 1(0.5%) 
Total 501 209(41.7%) 89(17.8%) 59(11.8%) 13(2.6%) 130(25.9%) 1(0.2%) 
Source: Kwak (2010, p. 29) and Social Enterprise Promotion Agency (2010, p. 15). 
 
